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Fifteen years ago, the UN Security Council responded to devastating violence in the Balkans by taking novel action: it created a war crimes court as an enforcement 
measure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.2 At the time, 
many saw the Council’s action as a cynical gesture, aimed at 
placating public demand for more assertive action to halt the 
carnage then in full rage in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Few, if any, 
believed that the Council’s ad hoc innovation would become 
precedent for future action. 
Yet despite its inauspicious beginning, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) launched 
a new era in international law and institutions. What had long 
seemed implausible—a revival of Nuremberg-type tribunals—
soon became a normal though hardly routine response to 
mass atrocities. A year and a half after it created the ICTY, 
the Security Council created a similar court to provide some 
measure of justice for those who survived the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda.3 Since then, the UN has played a key role in creating—
sometimes together with a host State—courts empowered to 
address notorious crimes committed in Sierra Leone, Timor 
Leste, Kosovo, Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Lebanon. 
By the time a permanent international criminal court began 
its legal life in 2002, the institutionalization of global justice 
seemed more inevitable than remarkable.
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December 14, 1996 signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in Paris, ending the war in the former Yugoslavia.
The proliferation and lengthening life of contemporary tri-
bunals has spawned robust debate about their accomplishments. 
Citing their substantial costs, critics charge that war crimes tri-
bunals have accomplished comparatively little and may even at 
times stand in the way of progress in areas as urgently important 
as securing a peaceful end to conflict or a stable foundation for 
social reconstruction. Proponents acknowledge that interna-
tional tribunals have hardly operated in a flawless fashion and 
are quick to note that expectations for such courts should be kept 
within reasonable bounds. Yet, they argue, these bodies have 
helped dispel impunity for vicious crimes, deepened jurispru-
dence concerning international humanitarian law and, perhaps 
most important, honored and partially redeemed victims’ suffer-
ing for crimes that should never have been permitted to sweep 
unchecked.
While views on all sides have evinced deep conviction, they 
have rarely been grounded in empirical evidence. In this setting, 
and with the fifteenth anniversary of the ICTY then looming on 
the near horizon, I devoted a recent sabbatical year to studying 
the ICTY’s impact on the ground in countries most directly 
affected by its work.4 In May 2008, on the fifteenth anniversary 
of the ICTY’s creation, the Open Society Justice Initiative pub-
lished the first tranche of this research in a report, Shrinking the 
Space for Denial: The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia (“Shrinking 
the Space for Denial”).
The report identified tangible impacts—these include, of 
course, the incapacitation of indicted war criminals, such as 
former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević—while trying 
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to capture the unquantifiable but consequential significance of 
these and other ICTY-related developments for Serbian society, 
both positive and negative. In brief, the study identified several 
key categories of impact—a concept whose meaning for pur-
poses of the report was informed in part by the views of Serbian 
citizens.5
social norms and institutions that form a crucial bulwark against 
a return to the violence of the 1990s.
Many Serbians are convinced that, without the ICTY, there 
would have been wholesale impunity for 1990s era atrocities 
committed by, or with the indispensable support of, Serbian 
leaders. In the words of Serbian journalist Filip Svarm, “It’s 
simple. If not for the Hague Tribunal, no one would ever actu-
ally bring to trial anyone who committed these crimes.”7 “The 
message,” Serbian human rights lawyer (and WCL alumnus) 
Bogdan Ivanišević believes, would have been that “one can do 
whatever he wants to do because he’s in power and that’s it. 
That kind of message would be disastrous. The ICTY prevented 
that from happening.”8 Instead of allowing wholesale impunity, 
another Serbian activist told me, the ICTY demonstrated that 
“there is no one who can order killings and stay unpunished.”9
iMpaCt on the ruLe of Law: doMestiC  
war CriMes proseCutions
While many Serbians believe that the ICTY’s prosecutions 
have themselves gone a long way toward dispelling impunity, a 
more tangible contribution—one that is closely bound up with 
the Tribunal’s preventive function—has been its role in spurring 
the creation of a credible system of domestic war crimes pros-
ecutions. Almost everyone I interviewed in Serbia believes that 
the ICTY provided crucial impetus for the creation in 2003 of a 
War Crimes Chamber (WCC) in the District Court of Belgrade 
and that the ICTY has bolstered that court’s capacity to investi-
gate and prosecute war crimes.
Striking in its own right, this development is the more 
remarkable because strengthening domestic legal capacity was 
not one of the original goals of the ICTY. To the contrary, a 
central premise behind its creation was that courts in the former 
Yugoslavia were unable or could not be trusted to bring perpe-
trators of atrocities to justice.
Space does not permit more than a few, incomplete obser-
vations about how this unexpected contribution came to pass 
(Shrinking the Space for Denial examines the phenomenon in 
some depth). Notably, Serbians see the ICTY’s operation as a 
harsh judgment on Serbian justice. Once political conditions in 
Serbia made local war crimes prosecutions viable (this develop-
Serbian supporters of 
the ICTY believe that, 
in myriad ways, the 
Tribunal’s work has 
strengthened social norms 
and institutions that form  
a crucial bulwark  
against a return to the 
violence of the 1990s.
deterrenCe vs. prevention:  
dispeLLing iMpunity
Tribunal skeptics charge that the ICTY has failed to achieve 
one of its core aims—to deter further atrocities. As has often 
been noted, the worst atrocity in Europe since the Holocaust, 
the 1995 genocide in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica,6 occurred 
after the ICTY had begun operating. Nor did the ICTY prevent 
Serbian atrocities in Kosovo, which prompted a 1999 military 
intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
But if the ICTY failed to deter these crimes, this does not 
close the book on the question whether or to what extent a more 
fully functioning international tribunal can deter crimes (or 
even whether the ICTY has deterred some crimes). After all, the 
ICTY had managed to secure custody over just one, low-level 
suspect by the time the Srebrenica massacre occurred, and its 
ability to secure custody of indictees remained problematic at 
the time abuses surged in Kosovo. Many are convinced that over 
time, as the ICTY has gained custody over most of its indictees, 
including senior officials, it has deterred atrocious crimes that 
would have been committed but for its existence—a proposition 
that by its nature cannot be proved. (Indeed, the study did not 
attempt to reach conclusions on this dimension of impact.)
While it is impossible to gauge the extent to which (if any) 
the ICTY has deterred criminal conduct, this point should not be 
confused with a related question: whether it has served a broader 
preventive function. Serbian supporters of the ICTY believe 
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ment emerged alongside pressures for the ICTY to wind up its 
own work in part by transferring some of its cases to domestic 
courts), the Serbian War Crimes Prosecutor was keen to demon-
strate local competence, as a matter of national and professional 
pride. In larger perspective, as the President of the WCC told 
me, the ICTY was “the embryo” for his court, providing the 
“idea” as well as “know how”.10 
Against a protracted period of Serbian hostility toward the 
ICTY, it is nothing less than remarkable that the word most 
often used to describe the relationship between the ICTY 
Prosecutor and his Serbian counterpart is that of “partner-
ship.” Notably, when the ICTY at long last obtained custody 
of Radovan Karadžić—one of its most notorious fugitives 
from justice—in July 2008, ICTY Prosecutor Serge Brammertz 
hailed the achievements of his “colleagues in Belgrade” who 
secured custody of Karadžić, including the Serbian War Crimes 
Prosecutor.11
reMoving dangerous individuaLs
In the view of some Serbians interviewed for my study, 
another key dimension of the ICTY’s preventive impact, 
broadly defined, is the Tribunal’s role in “physically removing 
some of the worst criminals” from the region, which journal-
ist Dejan Anastasijević describes as an important contribution 
“that is usually neglected by experts.”12 Some believe that the 
ICTY’s prosecution of former President Milošević in particular 
facilitated Serbia’s transition to democracy (a process that has 
nonetheless been halting and vexed). In the words of an official 
of the first post-Milošević administration, the former leader’s 
“removal . . . was something that had to be done in order to 
make the next step in our democratization process. He would 
have been an unbearable burden [if he were tried] in Serbian 
jurisdiction.”13
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shrinking the spaCe for deniaL
Serbians who support the ICTY believe that one of its most 
important functions is to foster a fuller reckoning by Serbian 
society with past atrocities committed by or at the instigation 
of their leaders—and to condemn them unequivocally. Public 
opinion surveys suggest that the ICTY’s impact in this regard 
has been modest at best. Only half of the respondents surveyed 
in December 2006 reported, for example, that they believed 
reports that a large number of Muslims had been massacred in 
Srebrenica.14
Yet few doubt that evidence introduced in The Hague has, 
in the words of Serbian attorney Ivan Janković, significantly 
“shrunk the public space” for denying the truth about notorious 
crimes committed by Serbs.15 A video of a Serb paramilitary 
unit executing six Bosnian Muslim men who were taken from 
Srebrenica during the 1995 genocide there, shown during the 
trial of Slobodan Milošević, had a galvanizing impact in Serbia. 
Repeatedly rebroadcast on Serbian television, the video “ripped 
away the veil of secrecy and denial of Serbian military opera-
tions in Bosnia,” the Washington Post reported. “No longer was 
it possible to label atrocity tales as Bosnian Muslim propaganda 
. . . , as many Serbs had done for a decade.”16 Still, as civic 
leader Jadranka Jelenč  ić noted, this knowledge “doesn’t neces-
sarily make people regret” crimes they can no longer credibly 
deny.17
the work of generations
Fifteen years after the ICTY’s creation, it is now possible 
to take a preliminary measure of its impact. By equal measure, 
however, it is far too soon to know its legacy. Scholars of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal know that its impact in Germany has 
unfolded and evolved across decades. So, too, the impact of the 
ICTY will be the work of generations.  HRB
